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Informal Physical Reasoning Processes
Kurt Ammon∗
Abstract
A fundamental question is whether Turing machines can model all
reasoning processes. We introduce an existence principle stating that the
perception of the physical existence of any Turing program can serve as a
physical causation for the application of any Turing-computable function
to this Turing program. The existence principle overcomes the limitation
of the outputs of Turing machines to lists, that is, recursively enumerable
sets. The principle is illustrated by productive partial functions for pro-
ductive sets such as the set of the Go¨del numbers of the Turing-computable
total functions. The existence principle and productive functions imply
the existence of physical systems whose reasoning processes cannot be
modeled by Turing machines. These systems are called creative. Creative
systems can prove the undecidable formula in Go¨del’s theorem in another
formal system which is constructed at a later point in time. A hypoth-
esis about creative systems, which is based on computer experiments, is
introduced.
1 Introduction
Turing [1969, p. 21, and 1948, p. 17, in the original typescript] discusses the
development of intelligence in man and in machines:
If the untrained infants mind is to become an intelligent one, it
must acquire both discipline and initiative. So far we have been
considering only discipline. To convert a brain or machine into a
universal machine is the extremest form of discipline. But discipline
is certainly not enough in itself to produce intelligence. That which
is required in addition we call initiative. ... Our task is to discover
the nature of this residue as it occurs in man, and to try and copy
it in machines.
Thus, Turing’s discipline is the execution of a universal [Turing] machine, that
is, the execution of an ordinary computer program. He writes: “That which
is required in addition [to produce intelligence] we call initiative.” This means
that Turing assumes that intelligence cannot completely be represented by any
∗Correspondence to kurtammon[at]csyst.org. Comments are welcome.
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Turing machine, that is, any computer program, and requires something that is
called initiative by Turing.
Russell and Norvig [2010, p. 1020] refer to an assertion in the field of Artificial
Intelligence :
The proposal for the 1956 summer workshop that defined the field
of Artificial Intelligence (McCarthy et al., 1955) made the assertion
that “Every aspect of learning or any other feature of intelligence
can be so precisely described that a machine can be made to simulate
it.
Thus, McCarthy et al. [1955] assume that “every aspect of learning or any
other feature of intelligence” can be formalized, that is, can be represented by a
Turing machine. In contrast, Turing [1969] assumes that something “is required
in addition” to produce intelligence.
The reason why something “is required in addition” can be illustrated by
productive functions which can be regarded as a formal abstraction of the con-
struction of the undecidable formula in Go¨del’s [1965] incompleteness theorem.
Let P1, P2, P3, ... be a fixed listing of all Turing programs, that is, the set of
instructions of all Turing machines (see Rogers [1987, p. 21]). The indices 1, 2,
3, ... of the Turing programs P1, P2, P3, ... are called Go¨del numbers. We write
ϕi for the partial
1 function computed by the Turing program Pi, where i is any
Go¨del number. A Turing-computable partial function ψ is called productive for
a set A of natural numbers if, given any Turing-computable total2 function ϕi
whose output is a subset S of A, then ψ is defined for the input i and the output
ψ(i) is contained in A, that is, ψ(i) ∈ A, but not in the output S of ϕi, that
is, ψ(i) /∈ S.3 Roughly speaking, Turing programs cannot generate all members
of a productive set A because, given any Turing-computable total function ϕi
whose output is a subset S of A, then ψ(i) ∈ A and ψ(i) /∈ S. An example of a
productive set is the set of the Go¨del numbers of the Turing-computable total
functions whose inputs and output are natural numbers (see Rogers [1987, p.
84, Example 2]).
A set is called recursively enumerable if it is empty or the output
{ϕi(1), ϕi(2), ϕi(3), ...} (1)
of a Turing-computable total function ϕi (see Rogers [1987, p. 58]). Productive
functions can be used to construct a larger recursively enumerable subset of a
productive setA from any given recursively enumerable subset ofA. Referring to
his definition of a productive partial function for a productive set [Rogers, 1987,
p. 84], Rogers [1987, p. 90] writes:
1A function is called partial if it is defined for some but not necessarily all natural numbers
in its input.
2A function is called total if it it defined for all natural numbers in its input.
3This definition of productive functions and sets is equivalent to Rogers [1987, pp. 84, 90]
because of basic theorems such as Rogers [1987, p. 60, Theorem V, and p. 61, Corollary V(b)].
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It follows from the definition of productiveness that if a set A is
productive, then there is an effective procedure by which, given any
recursively enumerable subset of A, we can get a larger recursively
enumerable subset of A.
The core of the construction of larger recursively enumerable subsets of a pro-
ductive set may be summarized in the informal rule
if given Pi then apply ψ to i, (2)
where Pi is a Turing program computing a total function whose output is a
subset S of a productive set A and ψ is a productive function for A. The
application of the productive function ψ in the rule (2) to the Go¨del number i
of the Turing program Pi yields a natural number ψ(i) ∈ A that is not contained
in the output S of Pi. From the subset S of A and the natural number ψ(i) we
can get a larger subset S ∪ {ψ(i)} of A.
It is not possible to use the Turing program Pi and the productive function
ψ in (2) to construct a Turing program, say Pj , that computes a total function
whose output is a subset of the productive set A and contains the rule (2) such
that Pj generates the output of any given Turing program Pi in (2) and the
natural numbers ψ(i) although ψ is Turing-computable. A reason is that the
application of the productive function ψ to the Go¨del number j of the Turing
program Pj yields a natural number ψ(j) that is not contained in the output of
Pj . This means that the application of the productive function ψ to j implies
that such a Turing program Pj cannot be given, that is, it cannot exist. An
explanation is that the application of the productive function ψ to the Go¨del
number j of Pj cannot be achieved in the Turing program Pj itself. Roughly
speaking, Pj cannot refer to itself, that is, its own existence.
But a human can apply the informal rule (2). If any Turing program Pi
according to (2) is given, a human can apply the productive function ψ to i and
use the result ψ(i) to produce a set that is larger than the output of Pi although
there is no Turing program whose output contains all outputs that a human
produces by applying the informal rule (2). Thus, productive functions, which
can be regarded as a formal abstraction of the construction of the undecidable
formula in Go¨del’s [1965] incompleteness theorem, provide an explanation for
Turing’s [1969] assumption that intelligence cannot completely be represented
by any Turing machine, that is, any computer program, and requires something
that is called initiative. The application of the informal rule (2) appears as
a dynamical process that cannot be formalized in advance because the Turing
program Pi in (2) need not be given at present but can be given in the future
by applying a productive function. This means that the Go¨del numbers of the
Turing programs Pi in the input of (2) need not be recursively enumerable.
A scientific theory of the informal rule (2), in particular, a theory of its tech-
nical, that is, physical implementation requires the solution of three problems.
The first problem is the problem of existence because the word “given” in (2)
must refer to any given, that is, existing Turing program Pi. This problem is
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fundamental because the set of the possible Go¨del numbers of the Turing pro-
grams Pi in the input of (2) is not recursively enumerable. The second problem
is how a reference to a “given”, that is, existing Turing program Pi in (2) can be
established. The third problem is the problem of the physical causation for the
application of the productive function ψ in (2), that is, the push of the button
to apply ψ to i.
The three problems of a scientific theory of the informal rule (2), that is, the
problems of the existence of a Turing program Pi, the reference to Pi, and the
causation to apply ψ to i are solved by an existence principle stating that the
perception of the physical existence of a Turing program can serve as a physical
causation for the application of any Turing-computable function, for example,
a productive function, to this information.
Section 2 introduces the existence principle. Section 3 outlines implications
of the existence principle for reasoning processes. Section 4 discusses our results,
in particular, the Church-Turing thesis.
2 Existence
The following physical existence principle solves the three problems of a scientific
theory of the informal rule (2) in Section 1, that is, the problems of the existence
of a Turing program Pi, the reference to Pi, and the causation to apply a
productive function ψ to the Go¨del number i of Pi.
Physical Existence Principle. Let ψ be a productive partial function for
a productive set A. The perception of the physical existence of any Turing
program Pi that computes a total function whose output is a subset of the
productive set A can serve as a physical causation for the application of the
productive function ψ to the Go¨del number i of Pi.
The principle solves the problem of the existence of the Turing program Pi in
the informal rule (2) because it refers to the physical existence of Pi. Therefore,
the set of the Go¨del numbers of the Turing programs Pi in the input of (2)
need not be recursively enumerable. Thus, the informal rule (2) can process a
set of Go¨del numbers that is not recursively enumerable because the set of the
Go¨del numbers that satisfy the conditions in (2) is productive. The physical
existence principle also solves the problem of the reference to Pi because the
perception of the physical existence of the Turing program Pi in (2) establishes
a reference to Pi. For example, this perception can be achieved by light, that
is, electromagnetic waves. A human can use his eyes to perceive a physical
representation of Pi. A technical input device is a camera that is connected
to a computer. In general, this perception can be achieved by any physical
means, for example, the physical means for the perception of a Turing program
Pi that is represented in the brain of a human. Finally, the physical existence
principle also solves the problem of causation because the perception of the
physical representation of Pi can cause a human to start the execution of a
Turing program, that is, a computer program. The perception of the physical
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representation of Pi by means of a connected camera can cause a computer to
start a program.
Definition 1. A physical system that contains an implementation of the phys-
ical existence principle is called creative system.4
By means of the physical existence principle the informal rule (2) in Section
1 can be transformed into the following precise physical rule:
Rule 1. Let ψ be a productive partial function for a productive set A. Then
if exists Pi then apply ψ to i, (3)
where Pi is a Turing program computing a total function whose output is a
subset S of the productive set A and exists means that Pi exists physically,
describes an implementation of the physical existence principle.
Thus, the word exists in (3) refers to a physical process, that is, that the
perception of the physical existence of Pi serves as a physical causation for the
application of the productive function ψ to the Go¨del number i of Pi according
to the physical existence principle.
If a creative system according to Definition 1 contains an implementation
of the physical rule (3), it applies the physical rule (3), that is, it applies the
productive function ψ to the Go¨del number i of any existing Turing program
Pi computing a total function whose output is a subset S of the productive set
A according to (3). This means that the Go¨del numbers i in the input of the
physical rule (3) need not be recursively enumerable because A is a productive
set such that for any Turing program Pi computing a total function whose
output is a subset S of A there exists a Turing program computing a total
function whose output is a subset of A that is larger that S.
If we abstract the logical aspects from the physical existence principle we
get the following principle:
Logical Existence Principle. Let ψ be a productive partial function for a
productive set A. A creative system can apply the productive function ψ to
the Go¨del number i of any existing Turing program Pi that computes a total
function whose output is a subset of the productive set A.
By means of the logical existence principle we can prove theorems about
creative systems.
Roughly speaking, the following theorem states that the outputs of creative
systems cannot be generated by Turing programs.
4Ammon [1987, Section 3.1] defines a creative system by requiring that it can determine
outputs of functions that cannot be computed by Turing programs, that is, for a given Turing
program a creative system can determine such outputs that are not contained in the outputs
of the Turing program. Roughly speaking, a creative system cannot be modeled by a Turing
program because it can use the program as a basis for its further development.
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Theorem 1. Let ψ be a productive partial function for a productive set A, let
C be a creative system that applies the physical rule (3), and let C produce any
sequence
j1, j2, j3, ... (4)
of Go¨del numbers that are contained in the productive set A. Then, there exists
no Turing program whose output is the sequence (4).
Proof. Let Pi be an existing Turing program that produces the sequence (4) of
Go¨del numbers. Because the creative system C applies the physical rule (3), C
produces an output ψ(i) by applying the productive function ψ to the Go¨del
number i of Pi. Because the Go¨del numbers j1, j2, j3, ... in (4) are contained in
the productive set A and ψ is a productive function for A, ψ(i) is not contained
in the output of Pi, that is, ψ(i) is different from all Go¨del numbers j1, j2, j3,
... in (4). Therefore, the Turing program Pi does not produce the sequence
(4) which is produced by the creative system C. Thus, our original assumption
that the Turing program Pi produces the sequence (4) yields a contradiction.
Hence, there exists no Turing program whose output is the sequence (4).
Theorem 1 implies the existence of creative physical systems that cannot
be modeled by any Turing program, that is, Turing machine, because creative
systems can perceive the physical existence of the Turing machine and thus use
this machine as a basis to produce an output that is not contained in the output
of this machine.
3 Reasoning
The Turing program Pi in input of the physical rule (3) in Section 2 can be
interpreted as a proposed description of the sequence (4) in Section 2 which
is produced by the creative system C in Theorem 1. C applies the productive
function ψ in (3) to the Go¨del number i of Pi, that is, to the proposed description
of the sequence (4). This produces an output ψ(i) which is not contained in the
output of Pi according to the proof of Theorem 1. The output of Pi is a subset
of the productive set A in Theorem 1. The output ψ(i) of C and the output
{ϕi(1), ϕi(2), ϕi(3), ...} (5)
of Pi, where ϕi is the function computed by Pi, form a larger recursively enu-
merable subset
{ψ(i), ϕi(1), ϕi(2), ϕi(3), ...} (6)
of A which is the output of another Turing program, say Pj . Thus, the creative
system C uses a Turing program Pi in its input, which can be regarded as a
proposed description of its output (4), to produce an output ψ(i) that can be
used to construct a Turing program Pj whose output (6) is larger than the
output (5) of Pi.
The construction of a Turing program Pj whose output (6) is larger than
the output (5) of any Pi that exists physically and computes a total function
6
whose output is subset of a productive set cannot be formalized because there
is no general formal procedure for the application of the productive function
ψ to the Go¨del number i within Pi. But the physical rule (3), which is an
implementation of the existence principle, applies ψ to the Go¨del number i of
any Pi that satisfies the conditions given above such that the output ψ(i) can
be used to construct a Turing program Pj whose output (6) is larger than the
output (5) of Pi.
The Go¨del number i of the Turing program Pi in the physical rule (3), which
is an implementation of the existence principle, refers to Pi as a whole. This
holistic aspect of the physical rule (3) explains why there is no general formal
procedure for the application of the productive function ψ to the Go¨del number
i within Pi. Productive functions such as the function ψ in the physical rule (3)
can be regarded as a formal abstraction of the construction of the undecidable
formula in Go¨del’s [1965] incompleteness theorem. Kleene [1952, p. 426] writes:
“we can recognize that [the undecidable formula] Ap(p) [in the number-theoretic
formal system] is true by taking into view the structure of that system as a
whole”. Thus, the recognition of the truth of the undecidable formula Ap(p) in
Go¨del’s theorem, which cannot be proved in the number-theoretic formal system
according to Go¨del’s theorem, requires a reference to the (incomplete) formal
“system as a whole” which cannot be achieved within the formal system itself
because the formal system cannot take “into view the structure of that system
as a whole”. In particular, the Turing program Pi in the physical rule (3) is a
formal system which cannot take “into view the structure of that system as a
whole” because the formal system, that is, the Turing program Pi cannot use
its own Go¨del number i to produce the result ψ(i) of applying the productive
partial function ψ for the productive set A to i, that is, the application of ψ to
the Go¨del number i of Pi cannot be achieved within Pi. But we can recognize
the truth that ψ(i) is a member of the productive set A. An explanation for
our capability to recognize that ψ(i) is a member of A and the impossibility of
the Turing program Pi to apply ψ to the Go¨del number i of Pi within Pi can
be found in restrictions for formal systems. Kleene [1952, p. 64] writes:
Metamathematics must study the formal system as a system of sym-
bols, etc. which are considered wholly objectively. This means sim-
ply that those symbols, etc. are themselves the ultimate objects, and
are not being used to refer to something other than themselves. The
metamathematician looks at them, not through and beyond them;
thus they are objects without interpretation or meaning.
Thus, a reference of a formal system to itself as a whole cannot be achieved in
the formal system, for example, the use of the Go¨del number i of the Turing
program Pi in (3) within Pi itself. The physical existence principle describes
a general reference to a formal system as a whole because the perception of
the physical existence of the Turing program Pi, that is, the formal system,
establishes a general reference to this formal system as a whole. For example,
in the physical rule (3) the Go¨del number i is such a general reference to Pi as
a whole.
7
Let ψ be a productive partial function for a productive set A, let Px be a
physically existing Turing program that computes a total function whose output
is a subset of A, and let C be a creative system that applies the physical rule
(3) in Section 2. We assume that the Go¨del number x of Px is not known. The
creative system C can find the Go¨del number x of Px by generating 1, 2, 3, ..., i,
... and comparing P1, P2, P3, ..., Pi, ... with Px. If Pi is identical with Px, then
the creative system C applies physical rule (3), that is, it produces an output
ψ(i) by applying ψ to the Go¨del number i of Pi which is identical with the
Turing program Px that exists physically. If the Turing program Px computes
a total function whose output is a subset of A, then ψ(i) is not in the output
of Px, that is, Pi, according to Theorem 1 in Section 2. Thus, creative systems
can take “into view the structure of [the Turing program Px, that is, Pi] as a
whole” when they determine the Go¨del number i of a physically existing Turing
program Px whose Go¨del number x is not known. This implies that creative
systems can produce the output ψ(i) by applying ψ to the Go¨del number i of
any physically existing Turing program Pi computing a total function whose
output is a subset of A although there is no general formal procedure to achieve
this within Pi.
If we assume that the child’s mind can be represented by a formal system,
that is, a Turing program, at every point in time the existence principle implies
that the core of Turing’s [1969] initiative in Section 1 is an informal physical
reference of the child’s mind to itself as a whole at any point in time. This ref-
erence is established by the perception of the physical structures in the child’s
mind which form the basis for their further development, that is, there is no
formal description of the child’s development that can be given in advance but
the formal description at any point in time is the basis and method of its fur-
ther development. Thus, the existence principle implies that the core of the
development of the child’s mind, that is, the core of intelligence, is an informal
physical reference and application of the child’s mind to itself as a whole at any
point in time.
4 Discussion
Referring to his “Theorem 2.4, with its corollaries” Davis [1982a, pp. 121-122]
writes:
... these results really constitute an abstract form of Go¨del’s famous
incompleteness theorem ... they imply that an adequate development
of the theory of natural numbers, within a logic L, to the point where
membership in some given set Q of integers can be adequately dealt
with within the logic ... is possible only if Q happens to be recursively
enumerable. Hence, non-recursively enumerable sets can, at best, be
dealt with in an incomplete manner.
This implies that the sequence (4) in Theorem 1 in Section 2, which is produced
by a creative system C by means of the physical rule (3), cannot be dealt
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with within a logic L because the sequence (4) is not recursively enumerable
according to Theorem 1, that is, there is no Turing program, say Pi, whose
output is (4). The output of Pi corresponds to the “given set Q of integers” in
the above quotation from Davis [1982a, pp. 121-122]. In the proof of Theorem
1 the creative system C applies the productive function ψ to the Go¨del number
i of Pi which produces an output ψ(i) that is not contained in the output of Pi
but in the productive set A. Roughly speaking, creative systems can overcome
the limits of any logic that deals with subsets of productive sets because they
can apply productive functions, which can be computed by Turing machines, to
the recursively enumerable sets to which the logic is restricted.
Turing’s thesis states that every function that would be naturally regarded as
computable is computable under his definition, that is, by one of his machines
[Kleene, 1952, pp. 376-381]. Turing [1936, p. 231] restricts his machines to
a finite number of m-configurations (machine configurations) which are called
“states of mind” in his thesis. Turing [1936, pp. 249-250] supposes that the
“number of states of mind” is finite because some of them “will be confused”
if “we admitted an infinity of states of mind” (see Kleene [1952, pp. 376-377]).
Go¨del [1990, p. 306] regards the restriction to a finite number of states as a
“philosophical error in Turing’s work” and points out that “mental procedures”
may “go beyond mechanical procedures”. Go¨del [1990, p. 306] writes:
What Turing disregards completely is the fact that mind, in its use,
is not static, but constantly developing, ... There may exist sys-
tematic methods of actualizing this development, which could form
part of the procedure. Therefore, Turing’s number of distinguish-
able states of mind may converge toward infinity in the course of the
application of the procedure.
The Turing program Pi in Section 2 produces an output (5). The Turing pro-
gram Pj in Section 2 produces a larger output (6). The program Pj can be
constructed from the Turing program Pi and the productive function ψ by
means of the physical rule (3) in Section 2. The physical rule (3), which is an
implementation of the physical existence principle, can be regarded as a “sys-
tematic method” that cannot be modeled by any Turing machine according to
Theorem 1. In view of the structure of its output (6) the program Pj can be
constructed from the Turing program Pi and the productive function ψ, which
is computed by a Turing program, say Pk, in a straightforward manner such
that the number of states in Pj is greater than the sum of the number of states
in Pi and Pk. This suggests that the repeated application of the physical rule
(3) can produce Turing programs whose number of states grows in the course of
time. Thus, Turing’s assumption that the number of states is finite or infinite is
misleading because the number of states may grow in the course of time. There-
fore, a concept of time that cannot be formalized is necessary to understand the
development of “mind”.
Ammon [1993] describes an automatic proof of Go¨del’s incompleteness the-
orem by a system that is composed of heuristics. Because these heuristics are
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rather elementary they might be constructed automatically. Such computer ex-
periments (see Ammon [1988], [1992a], and [1992b]) and our theoretical results
suggest the following principle:
Development Principle. A creative system is a self-developing process which
starts from any universal programming language and any input. This process
cannot be reduced to a Turing machine but to the language and the input from
which it starts.
Thus, the structures in a creative system that exist presently form the basis,
that is, the input and the method for its further development. This cannot be
achieved by Turing programs. For example, the application of the productive
function ψ to the Go¨del number i of a Turing program Pi in the physical rule (3)
in Section 2 cannot be achieved within Pi. The development principle implies
that a creative system can be represented as a finite sequence of 0s and 1s or
a binary number at any point in time but it can construct and change any of
its structures in the course of time.5 This has implications for the technical
development of a creative system because it should start with the manual de-
velopment of a rather simple domain-specific language for a user interface which
can be used for its further development.
The proof of Theorem 1 in Section 2 derives a contradiction from the as-
sumption that an existing Turing program Pi computes the output (4) of a
creative system C. The proof uses the Go¨del number i of Pi which refers to
Pi as a whole. The reference of i to Pi is contained in the physical rule (1) in
the proof of Theorem 1. This physical reference of the Go¨del number i to Pi
cannot be modeled by any Turing machine Pi according to the proof because
the application of the productive function ψ to the Go¨del number i cannot be
achieved within Pi, that is, there is no general Turing program modeling the
application of ψ to the Go¨del number i.
Although the physical reference of the Go¨del number i to an existing Pi in the
proof of Theorem 1 is not Turing-computable, the construction of ψ(i), which is
not in the output of Pi, can be formally represented in another more powerful
Turing program that depends on the Go¨del number i of Pi. For example, such
a more powerful Turing program is the Turing program that produces the ex-
tended sequence (6) in Section 3. Even by means of the physical rule (1), that
is, the physical existence principle, we cannot construct a general Turing pro-
gram because we could apply a productive function ψ to such a Turing program
according to Theorem 1, that is, there is no such general Turing program.
The application of the physical existence principle, for example the physical
rule (1), requires resources, in particular time. The Turing program Pi in the
physical rule (1) must exist physically before it can be perceived according to
the physical existence principle. The output ψ(i) of the application of ψ to i and
the extended sequence (6) can exist only at a later point in time. According to
5Referring to computer experiments Ammon [1987, Section 5.3] writes: “The experiments
show that the knowledge required for mathematical research is surprisingly simple and domain
specific, but subject to rapid modifications and extensions.”
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Theorem 1 the output ψ(i) and the extended sequence (6) cannot be described in
advance by a general formal system, that is, a Turing program. By means of the
physical existence principle, for example the physical rule (1), more and more
powerful Turing programs can be constructed in the course of time. As soon
as the output ψ(i) or the extended sequence (6) exist physically and have been
perceived according to the physical existence principle their construction can be
described formally. Therefore, an informal concept of time is a prerequisite for
an understanding of the informal physical evolution of formal systems such as
Turing programs.
The physical existence principle and the logical existence principle in Section
2 are restricted to any productive partial function ψ for a productive set A and
any Turing program Pi that computes a total function whose output is a subset
of A. We can generalize the physical existence principle and the logical existence
principle by allowing any Turing-computable partial function ψ and any Turing
program Pi that satisfies any properties, that is, properties that cannot be
formalized in any single formal system.
General Physical Existence Principle. Let ψ be a Turing-computable par-
tial function. The perception of the physical existence of any Turing program Pi
that satisfies any properties can serve as a physical causation for the application
of the function ψ to the Go¨del number i of Pi.
General Logical Existence Principle. Let ψ be a Turing-computable partial
function. A creative system can apply the function ψ to the Go¨del number i of
any existing Turing program Pi that satisfies any properties.
By means of this generalized existence principle a creative system “can recog-
nize that [the undecidable formula] Ap(p) [in Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem] is
true by taking into view the structure of that [number-theoretic formal] system
as a whole” (see Kleene, [1952, p. 426]), that is, it can overcome the incomplete-
ness of the formal system. Such a formal system can be represented as a Turing
program Pi satisfying some simple properties, in particular, the property that
the formal system is consistent. This means that a Turing-computable partial
function ψ produces Kleene’s [1952, p. 426] representation of the undecidable
formula Ap(p) in Go¨del’s theorem from the Go¨del number i of the Turing pro-
gram Pi. A formal proof of Go¨del’s undecidable formula Ap(p) can be achieved
in another formal system, say Si, that depends on the Go¨del number i of Pi rep-
resenting the (incomplete) number-theoretic formal system. This implies that
a creative system can prove the truth of Go¨del’s undecidable formula Ap(p) in
the formal system Si because it can refer to the (incomplete) number-theoretic
formal system as a whole. Such a proof depends on the prerequisite that this
number-theoretic formal system is consistent (see Kleene [1952, p. 426]). Be-
cause the application of the physical existence principle requires resources, in
particular time, the Turing program Pi, which represents the number-theoretic
formal system, must exist physically before it can be perceived according to
the physical existence principle. The output ψ(i) of the application of ψ to the
Go¨del number i and the proof of ψ(i), that is, the undecidable formula Ap(p)
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in the formal system Si can exist only at a later point in time. According to
Go¨del’s theorem the output ψ(i), that is, the undecidable formula Ap(p) can-
not be proved in the number-theoretic formal system, which is represented by
Pi, but it can be proved by a creative system at a later point in time in an-
other formal system Si which can be constructed by means of the existence
principle. This applies to any existing number-theoretic formal system. By a
repeated application of the physical existence principle a creative system can
construct more and more powerful formal systems in the course of time which
cannot be described by any (existing) formal system in advance although any
individual construction can be proved in a formal system Si with the benefit of
hindsight. This confirms that an informal concept of time is a prerequisite for
an understanding of the informal physical evolution of formal systems which can
be represented by Turing programs. We discuss the application of the general
existence principle to Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem in detail in the following
paragraphs.
Davis [1993, p. 611] argues that Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem can be
proved in a formal system:
It [Go¨del’s theorem] is, however, a quite ordinary sentence of elemen-
tary number theory and can be proved with no difficulty whatever
in any formal system adequate for elementary number theory, such
as for example Peano arithmetic. Note that this powerful form of
Go¨del’s theorem applies uniformly to any formalism whatever.
A formal system, say S1, “adequate for elementary number theory, such as for
example Peano arithmetic”, in which Go¨del’s theorem is proved, is incomplete
as well. Thus, a proof of Go¨del’s theorem for S1 requires another formal system,
say S2, which refers to S1. A proof of Go¨del’s theorem for S2 requires another
formal system, say S3, which refers to S2, and so on. Thus, there is no proof
in any formal system showing that Go¨del’s theorem applies “to any formalism
whatever”. An exception is any formal system itself such as S1, S2, S3, and so
on in which Go¨del’s theorem is proved.
The first part of Go¨del’s (first incompleteness) theorem states that the un-
decidable formula Ap(p) is unprovable in the formal system if the system is
consistent (see Kleene [1952, p. 207, Theorem 28]). The following definition
prepares a theorem stating that a formalization of the proposition that Ap(p)
is true can be proved in another formal system that is called observing system.
Roughly speaking, an observing system formalizes the view of a mathematician
who proves the first part of Go¨del’s theorem.
Definition 2. Let S be a formal system. An observing system of the observed
system S is a formal system S that is a copy of S containing a formal symbol S
for S. If F is a formal expression, that is, a finite sequence of formal symbols,
in S, we write F for the formal expression that represents F in S, that is, it
contains the formal symbol S for S. F is called the observing formula of the
observed formula F in S.
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Example 1. The construction of undecidable formula Ap(p) in Go¨del’s theorem
is based on a predicate A(a, b) which is defined by (see Kleene [1952, p. 206,
Lemma 21]):
A(a, b): a is the Go¨del number of a formula Aa(a) with a free variable a and
b is the Go¨del number of a proof of the formula Aa(a), where a is the formal
expression representing the number a.6
The definition of A(a, b) implicitly refers to formulas in a formal system, say,
S. We extend the definition of A(a, b) by including an explicit reference to S.
This yields:
A′(a, b): a is the Go¨del number of a formula Aa(a) in S with a free variable
a and b is the Go¨del number of a proof of the formula Aa(a) in S, where a is
the formal expression representing the number a.
The predicate A(a, b) can be expressed by a formula A(a, b) in S (see Kleene
[1952, p. 207]). Analogously, the extended predicate A′(a, b) can be expressed by
a formula A′(a, b) in the formal system S that is an observing system of S and
contains a formal symbol S for S (see Definition 2). Thus, the formula A′(a, b)
is the observing formula A(a, b) of the formula A(a, b) in S. Analogously to the
construction of the undecidable formula Ap(p), that is,
∀b¬A(p, b), (7)
from the formula A(a, b) in S (see Kleene [1952, p. 207]), we can construct an
observing formula Ap(p) from the formula A
′(a, b) in S as follows: Let p′ be
the Go¨del number of the formula ∀b¬A′(a, b), that is, Ap′ (a), which contains
the free variable a and no other free variable. The substitution of the formal
representation p′ of the Go¨del number p′ for the variable a in Ap′(a), which uses
Cantor’s diagonal method, yields Ap′ (p
′), that is,
∀b¬A′(p′, b), (8)
which is the observing formula Ap(p) of Go¨del’s undecidable formula Ap(p) (see
Kleene [1952, p. 207]).
The following theorem states that a formalization of the proposition that the
undecidable formula Ap(p) in an observed formal system is true can be proved
in the observing formal system.
Theorem 2. Let Ap(p) be the undecidable formula in a formal system S. The
observing formula Ap(p) of Ap(p) is provable in the observing system S of S if
S is consistent.
Proof. The first half of Go¨del’s theorem states that the formula Ap(p) is unprov-
able in the formal system S if S is consistent (see Kleene [1952, p. 207, Theorem
28]). Because the proposition that Ap(p) is unprovable in S is expressed, via the
6We write An for the formula whose Go¨del number is n. For An we may write An(a)
showing the free variable a for use with substitution (see Kleene [1952, p. 206, Lemma 21]).
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Go¨del numbering, by the formula Ap(p), Ap(p) is a formalization of the propo-
sition that Ap(p) is unprovable in S.
7 The proposition that S is consistent can
be formalized as well (see Kleene [1952, p. 210]). Let Consys be a formalization
of the proposition that S is consistent. The proof of the first half of Go¨del’s
theorem that the formula Ap(p) is unprovable in S if S is consistent can also
be formalized in S (see Kleene [1952, pp. 210-211]). Thus, we have
⊢S Consys =⇒ Ap(p), (9)
that is, there is a proof in S that the consistency of S implies the formula Ap(p)
in S.8 The formula
Consys =⇒ Ap(p) (10)
in (9) corresponds to the observing formula
Consys =⇒ Ap(p), (11)
in S and the proof of (10) in S corresponds to the observing proof of (11) in S.
Thus,
⊢S Consys =⇒ Ap(p), (12)
that is, there is a proof in S that the consistency of S implies the observing
formula Ap(p) of Ap(p). Therefore, (12) corresponds to the theorem. Thus, the
proof is complete.
The observing formula Ap(p) in S corresponds to the formula Ap′ (p
′) in
Example 1. Because S is a copy of S containing a formal symbol for S, the
observed theorems of all theorems in S can be proved in S. Because the ob-
serving formula Ap(p) of the undecidable formula Ap(p), which is not provable
in S according to Go¨del’s theorem, is provable in S, the representation of the
formal expressions in S by Go¨del numbers in the formal system S yields proofs
of more theorems. Roughly speaking, the observing formal system S is more
powerful than the observed formal system S.
The observing formula Ap(p), which contains a formal symbol S for S, can
be interpreted as a formalization of the proposition that Ap(p) is true from a
mathematician’s point of view who refers to S, that is, the observing system S is
a formalization of a mathematician’s point of view who proves Go¨del’s theorem.
The formal system S depends on S, that is, it can be constructed from S because
it is a copy of S containing a formal symbol S for S (see Definition 2).
Referring to his undecidable formula Ap(p) in Go¨del’s incompleteness theo-
rem Kleene [1952, p. 426] writes:
... if we suppose the number-theoretic formal system to be consis-
tent, we can recognize that Ap(p) is true by taking into view the
7Kleene [1952, p. 207] writes: “.. we can interpret the formula Ap(p) from our perspective
of Go¨del numbering as expressing the proposition that Ap(p) is unprovable, i.e., it is a formula
A which asserts its own unprovability.
8This proof is a part of the proof of Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem which states
that the consistency of S cannot be proved in S (see Kleene [1952, pp. 210-211]).
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structure of that system as a whole, though we cannot recognize the
truth of Ap(p) by use only of the principles of inference formalized
in that system, i.e. not ⊢ Ap(p).
9
As described above, the observing formula Ap(p) can be interpreted as a for-
malization of the proposition that Ap(p) is true from a mathematician’s point
of view who proves Go¨del’s theorem, that is, the proposition that Ap(p) is true
can be formalized and be proved in the observing formal system S. The formal
symbol S for S in S can be regarded as a reference to S “as a whole”.
According to (9) in the proof of Theorem (2) the formula
Consys =⇒ Ap(p), (13)
which is a formalization of the first part of Go¨del’s theorem, can be proved in
S. But in this formalization (13) the reference to S is lost, in particular, the
reference of Consys to S. It cannot be added to S because this implies that
Ap(p) can be proved in S which contradicts Go¨del’s theorem.
The observing system S is a formal copy of S containing a formal symbol S
for S (see Definition 2). Because S is a formalization of Go¨del’s theorem and
proof from a mathematician’s point of view and Ap(p) cannot be proved in S,
S, which is a formalization of the first part of Go¨del’s theorem and proof includ-
ing a reference to S, cannot be represented in S. This implies that S is more
“powerful” than S. Therefore, a mathematician can construct a more “pow-
erful” formal system S from any consistent formal system S because Go¨del’s
proof applies to any consistent system S, that is, “to any formalism whatever”.
This means that Theorem 2 can be regarded as a proof of the general existence
principle, where the Turing program Pi in the existence principle represents the
system S and ψ in the existence principle corresponds to the construction of
S from Pi, that is, S. Thus, the application of ψ to the Go¨del number i of Pi
yields S which contains a formal symbol S for S and a formal proof of the first
part of Go¨del’s theorem from a mathematician’s point of view who refers to S.
Theorem 2 implies that the logical existence principle cannot be formalized,
that is, it implies the existence of an informal physical process which is described
by the physical existence principle. In view of Theorem 2 this process can include
a reference to any formal system S which is represented in a more “powerful”
formal system S by a formal symbol S for S. Thus, Theorem 2 implies the
existence of physical systems that are capable of constructing a more “powerful”
formal system S from any formal system S in an informal physical process.
These systems are called creative.
The general existence principle is a generalization of the existence principle
in Section 2 which is restricted to productive functions ψ for productive sets A
that are applied to the Go¨del number i of a Turing program Pi whose output
is a subset of A. A creative system (see Definition 1 in Section 2) can apply ψ
to the Go¨del number i of any Pi although this application cannot be formalized
9The expression “not ⊢ Ap(p)” in Kleene [1952] means that the undecidable formula Ap(p)
in Go¨del’s theorem is not provable in the formal system.
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because ψ is a productive function. The reason is that a general formal reference
to the Go¨del number i cannot be represented within Pi. This corresponds to
the impossibility to represent a reference to S within a formalization (13) of the
first part of Go¨del’s theorem in S. This reference can only be represented in an
extended formal system S that contains a formal symbol S for S representing
this reference.
For decades there is a discussion whether Go¨dels incompleteness theorem
implies limitations on what computers can prove (see Lucas [1961]). Russell
and Norvig [2010, p. 1023] write:
Philosophers such as J. R. Lucas (1961) have claimed that this the-
orem shows that machines are mentally inferior to humans, because
machines are formal systems that are limited by the incomplete-
ness theorem - they cannot establish the truth of their own Go¨del
sentence - while humans have no such limitation.
... it is impossible to prove that humans are not subject to Go¨dels
incompleteness theorem because any rigorous proof would require a
formalization of the claimed unformalizable human talent, and hence
refute itself.
Theorem 2 states that the observing formula Ap(p) is provable in the observing
formal system S. As described above, Ap(p) can be interpreted as a formaliza-
tion of the proposition that the undecidable formula Ap(p) in Go¨del’s theorem
is true from a mathematician’s point of view who proves Go¨del’s theorem. The
proof of Theorem 2 can be regarded as a rigorous proof that the construction
of the formal system system S from any system S cannot be formalized. S is
a formalization of the proof of the first part of Go¨del’s (first incompleteness)
theorem from a mathematicians point of view. This formalization is used in
the proof of Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem. Furthermore, S contains a
formal symbol S for S which is a formalization of the reference to S of a math-
ematician who proves the first part of Go¨del’s (first incompleteness) theorem.
This reference cannot be formalized in S because, as described above, a formal-
ization of this reference yields a contradiction to Go¨del’s (first incompleteness)
theorem.
According to Theorem 2 the observing formula Ap(p) of undecidable for-
mula Ap(p) in a formal system S is provable in the observing system S of S
if S is consistent. We write S0 for S and S1 for S. S1, that is, S, contains
another undecidable formula whose observing formula can be proved in another
observing system S2, and so on. Thus, a sequence S1, S2, S3, ... of more and
more “powerful” formal systems arises which contain proofs of more and more
formulas. As described above Theorem 2 implies that each of the formal sys-
tems Si cannot be represented in the preceding formal system Si−1. By means
of Go¨del numbers the proofs of more and more formulas in S1, S2, S3, ... can
be transformed into proofs in number theory. Thus, a more and more complete
number theory arises.
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Church’s [1965, pp. 90, 100-102] thesis10 states that every effectively calcu-
lable function is general recursive, that is, computable by a Turing machine (see
Church, 1965, pp. 90, 100-102, and Kleene [1952, pp. 300–301, 317–323]). Since
“effective calculability” is an intuitive concept, the thesis cannot be proved (see
Kleene [1952, p. 317]).11
Church [1965, pp. 90, 102] presents his thesis as a “definition of effective
calculability:
... (1) by defining a function to be effectively calculable if there is
an algorithm for the calculation of its values ...
According to Theorem 1 in Section 2 the sequence (4) produced by a creative
system C that applies the physical rule (3) cannot be computed by any Turing
program.
Church [1965, pp. 90, 102] proposes a second definition of effective calcula-
bility:
... (2) by defining a function F (of positive integers) to be effectively
calculable if, for every positive integer m, there exists a positive
integer n such that F (m) = n is a provable theorem.
If we require for every Turing program Pi in the input of the physical rule (3) in
Section 2 a proof in a formal system that the Turing program Pi computes a total
function whose output is a subset of a productive set A, then, for every Go¨del
number (positive integer) i in the input of (3), whose output is the sequence (4)
in Theorem 1, there exists a natural number y such that ψ(i) = y is a provable
theorem in some formal system, say Si. Such a formal system also exists for any
finite set of natural numbers i in the input of (3). But, because of Theorem 1,
there exists no formal system S, which can be represented by a Turing program,
such that ψ(i) = y, where y is a natural number, is a provable theorem in S
for all Go¨del numbers i of Turing programs Pi in the input of (3). Roughly
speaking, Theorem 1 implies that the formal systems Si cannot be unified into
a single formal system S.
In a letter of June 8, 1937, to Pepis Church wrote (see Sieg [1997, pp. 175–
176]):
... if a numerical function f is effectively calculable then for every
positive integer a there must exist a positive integer b such that a
valid proof can be given of the proposition f(a) = b ...
Therefore to discover a function which was effectively calculable but
not general recursive would imply discovery of an utterly new prin-
ciple of logic, not only never before formulated, but never before
10The term Church’s thesis is due to Kleene [1965, p. 274] (see Kleene [1952, pp. 300, 317]).
11In his article “Why Go¨del Didn’t Have Church’s Thesis” Davis [1982b, p. 22, footnote 26]
writes: “We are not concerned here with attempts to distinguish ’mechanical procedures’ (to
which Church’s thesis is held to apply) from a possible broader class of ’effective procedures’
...”
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actually used in a mathematical proof - since all extant mathemat-
ics is formalizable within the system of Principia [Mathematica], or
at least within one of its known extensions. Moreover this new prin-
ciple of logic must be of so strange, and presumably complicated, a
kind that its metamathematical expression as a rule of inference was
not general recursive ...” .
The proof of Theorem 1 in Section 2 uses the physical rule (3) which is an
implementation of the existence principle. As far as we know the existence
principle was “never before actually used in a mathematical proof”. It allows the
application of productive functions to any existing Turing program. This cannot
be achieved by formal systems which cannot apply productive functions to the
recursively enumerable subsets of productive sets with which they deal only
incompletely. The logical existence principle abstracts the physical processes
from the physical existence principle such that it can be regarded as a principle
of logic which provides a general method of self-reference and self-application
that cannot be formalized. The output (4) of the physical rule (3) in Theorem 1,
which is an implementation of the existence principle, is not general recursive,
that is, it cannot be computed by a Turing program. The existence principle
may be regarded as strange because it refers to the perception of the physical
existence of a Turing program as a whole.
This work was influenced by Post [1965]. For example, Post [1965, p. 417]
writes:
The Logical Process is Essentially Creative
This conclusion, so in line with Bergson’s “Creative Evolution”, ...
We see that a machine would never give a complete logic; for once
the machine is made we could prove a theorem it does not prove.
In “Creative Evolution” Bergson [1911, p. 342] writes:
Time is invention or it is nothing at all.
The formal system S in Theorem 2 can be regarded as a “machine” that cannot
prove the undecidable formula Ap(p). Theorem 2 states that the observing
formula Ap(p) of Ap(p) can be proved in the observing formal system S which
is a copy of S containing a formal symbol S for S. As described above, the
observing formula Ap(p) can be regarded as a formalization of the proposition
that the undecidable formula Ap(p) is “true”. A mathematician is capable of
referring to the “machine” S as soon as S “is made”. Theorem 2 implies that
this is achieved in a physical process that cannot be formalized in a single formal
system.
Theorem 2 confirms Maturana and Varela [1980]. For example, Maturana
and Varela [1980, p. 51] write:
... he [the observer] both creates (invents) relations and generates
(specifies) the world (domain of interactions) in which he lives by
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continuously expanding his cognitive domain through recursive de-
scriptions and representations of his interactions. The new, then, is
a necessary result of the historical organization of the observer that
makes of every attained state the starting point for the specification
of the next one, which thus cannot be a strict repetition of any pre-
vious state; creativity is the cultural expression of this unavoidable
feature.
As described above, a sequence S1, S2, S3, ... of more and more “powerful”
observing systems can be produced in an informal process according to the gen-
eral existence principle. The observing systems S1, S2, S3, ... can be regarded
as recursive descriptions of an observer because each Si is constructed from
the preceding system Si−1 and a formal symbol for Si−1. Thus, every attained
state, that is, Si−1, is the starting point for the specification of the next one,
that is, Si, which cannot be a strict repetition of any previous state, for exam-
ple, Si−1, because Theorem 2 implies that each of the formal systems Si cannot
represented in the preceding formal system Si−1. Maturana and Varela [1980,
p. 53] write:
We cannot speak about the substratum in which our cognitive be-
havior is given, and about that of which we cannot speak, we must
remain silent, as indicated by Wittgenstein. ... It means that we
recognize that we, as thinking systems, live in a domain of descrip-
tions, ..., and that through descriptions we can indefinitely increase
the complexity of our cognitive domain.
As described above, Theorem 2 implies that the construction of the observing
system S from the formal system S cannot be represented in S, that is, there is
no general formal description of the construction of the formal system S from
S.12 Maturana and Varela [1992, p. 242] write:
By existing, we generate cognitive “blind spots” that can be cleared
only through generating new blind spots in another domain. We do
not see what we do not see, and what we do not see does not exist.
The undecidable formula Ap(p) in Go¨del’s theorem can be regarded as a “blind
spot” in a formal system, say S. According to Theorem 2, this “blind spot”
is “cleared” by the observing formula Ap(p) in the observing system S, which
is a copy of S containing a formal symbol S for S. This means that the ob-
serving formula Ap(p), which is a formalization of the proposition that Ap(p) is
“true”, can be proved in the observing system S, that is, in another “domain”.
As described above, a reference to S cannot be represented in S, that is, the
existence of the formal system S cannot be represented in S. In this sense, S
cannot represent its own existence. This reference to S is represented in S by
a formal symbol S for S (see Definition 2). As described above, Theorem 2
12Ammon [1987, Section 3.4] introduces principles on creative processes that are based on
computer experiments. For example, the shunyata principle in Ammon [1987, Section 3.4.5]
states that there is no explicit and general description of creative processes.
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implies that this reference to S as a whole is achieved in a physical process that
cannot be formalized in a single formal system. Maturana and Varela [1992,
p. 224] describe an experiment with a gorilla that suggests the existence of a
physical reference of the gorilla to himself as a whole:
A gorilla ... when first confronted with a mirror will appear amazed
and interested, but after becoming used to it, he will ignore it. ...
experimenters anesthetized a gorilla. A colored dot was painted
between his eyes - a place that could be seen only in the mirror.
After awakening from anesthesia, he was given a mirror. What a
surprise! Her put his hand to his forehead to touch the colored dot.
... this experiment suggests that the gorilla can generate a domain of
self through social distinctions. In this domain there is a possibility
of reflection as with a mirror or with language.
This experiment suggests that the gorilla has a fixed “symbol” for himself, that
is, any fixed means of representation in his brain that refers to himself. This
reference to himself “as a whole” is generated physically when he sees himself
in the mirror. It causes him to put his hand to his forehead. Thus, its own
existence generates a physical reference between a “symbol” for himself in his
brain and himself “as a whole” and a physical causation of an action. This
confirms Maturana and Varela’s view because it suggests that the gorilla has a
preliminary stage of a possibility of reflection in the sense that he can refer to
himself “as a whole”. Theorem 2 implies that such as physical reference cannot
be formalized in a single formal system. The construction of the observing
system S from the formal system S can be regarded as a model of reflection
because S is a copy of S that contains a formal symbol S referring to S as a
whole.
Theorem 2 states the observed formula of the undecidable formula in a for-
mal system S can be proved in another formal system S which is a copy of
S and contains a formal symbol S referring to S as a whole. The claim that
Go¨del’s theorem applies to any formal system implies that Go¨del’s theorem also
applies to S, that is, it is possible to refer to S and apply Go¨del’s proof to S al-
though there is no general formal reference to S, in particular, no general formal
procedure for the application of Go¨del’s proof to S, that is, to any observing
formal system. The possibility of a reference to S as a whole, in particular, an
application of Go¨del’s proof to S, that is, to any formal system, is described in
the general existence principle.
Ammon [1993, Sections 4 and 5] describes a computer proof of Go¨del’s theo-
rem for any formal number theory T , that is, T corresponds to the formal system
S in this paper. This computer proof of Go¨del’s theorem can be represented in
another formal system, say U . The claim that Go¨del’s theorem applies to any
formal number theory implies that Go¨del’s theorem also applies to U although
there is no general formal procedure for the application of Go¨del’s proof to U ,
that is, any formal system in which Go¨del’s proof is represented. As described
above, a reason is that such a system cannot refer to itself as a whole. Referring
to Penrose [1990, p. 694] Russell and Norvig [1995, p. 826] write:
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Penrose does not say why he thinks the ”Go¨delian insight” [that
the “Go¨del sentence” G(F ) of a formal system F is true] is not
formalizable, and it appears that in fact it has been formalized. In
his Ph.D. thesis, Natarajan Shankar (1986) used the Boyer-Moore
theorem prover BMTP to derive Go¨del’s theorem from a set of basic
axioms, in much the same way that Go¨del himself did.8
...
8 Ammon’s SHUNYATA system (1993) even appears to have de-
veloped by itself the diagonalization technique used by Go¨del and
developed originally by Cantor.
Because there is no general formal procedure for the application of Go¨del’s proof
to any formal system in which Go¨del’s proof is represented, a formal proof of
Go¨del’s theorem cannot be general.13
As described above, the possibility to apply any Turing-computable function
to any Turing program satisfying some properties, in particular, Go¨del’s proof
to any formal system in which Go¨del’s proof is represented, is characterized in
the general existence principle.
Go¨del’s theorem states that any formal system, say S, satisfying some simple
properties contains an undecidable formula Ap(p), that is, neither Ap(p) nor
its negation ¬Ap(p) can be proved in S (see Kleene [1952, p. 207, Theorem
28]). The “Go¨delian insight” in Russell and Norvig [1995, p. 826] corresponds
to Kleene [1952, p. 426]): “... we can recognize that Ap(p) is true by taking
into view the structure of that [formal] system as a whole”. Ap(p), that is,
∀b¬A(p, b), is a formalization of the proposition that the formula Ap(p) is not
provable in the formal system S because b is the Go¨del number of a proof of
the formula Aa(a) in the definition of the predicate A(a, b) (see Kleene [1952, p.
206, Lemma 21]) which is expressed by the formula A(a, b) (see Kleene [1952,
p. 207]).
Thus, Ap(p) is a formalization of the “true” proposition that Ap(p) is not
provable in S although Ap(p) is not provable in S to according Go¨del’s theorem.
13Ammon’s SHUNYATA program [1993] generated a proof of Go¨del’s theorem in the form:
There is a closed formula F in any formal number theory T such that
• if the theory T is consistent, F is not provable in T , and
• if the theory T is ω-consistent, ¬F is not provable in T
whose formalization in Ammon [1993] is:
all T (fnt(T )→ there-is F (closed-formula(F, T ) &
(consistent(T )→ not(provable(F, T ))) &
(ω-consistent(T )→ not(provable(¬F, T ))))).
In the formalization fnt(T ) means that T is a formal number theory. Thus, the formalization
of Go¨del’s theorem in Ammon [1993] refers to the [incomplete] formal theory T . Because the
formal theory, say U , in which Go¨del’s theorem and proof in Ammon [1993] are represented,
is incomplete as well, the claim that Go¨del’s theorem applies to all formal number theories
T implies that the theorem also applies to U . But the applicability of Go¨del’s theorem to U
cannot be represented in U because U cannot refer to U itself, that is, to itself as a whole.
This implies that there is no general formalization of the reference to all formal theories T to
which Go¨del’s theorem applies.
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Roughly speaking, Ap(p) is “true” but not provable in S.
The undecidable formula Ap(p) in the incomplete formal system S does not
contain a reference to S. If we add a formal symbol S for S to Ap(p) we obtain
the observing formula Ap(p) of Ap(p) (see Definition 2 and Example 1). Ap(p)
is a formalization of the proposition that Ap(p) is not provable in S. Theorem
2 states that the observing formula Ap(p) is provable in the observing [formal]
system S. All observing formulas of formulas that are provable in S are provable
in the observing system S. Additionally, the observing formula Ap(p) of Ap(p)
is provable in S. Therefore, the observing system S is more powerful in the
sense that it can prove more theorems than the observed system S.
The existence principle in Section 2, which is restricted to productive func-
tions, is a special case of the general existence principle in Section 4 which
applies to any Turing-computable function.
Roughly speaking, the general existence principle is the core of Turing’s
residue which is called initiative by Turing (see Section 1).
5 Conclusion
The physical existence principle states that the perception of the physical exis-
tence of any Turing program can serve as a physical causation for the application
of Turing-computable functions to this Turing program. The logical existence
principle abstracts the logical aspects from the physical existence principle. It is
used in the proof of a theorem stating that a physical rule, which is an implemen-
tation of the existence principle, produces a sequence that cannot be computed
by any Turing program. The logical existence principle can be regarded as a new
principle of logic that was never before used in a mathematical proof. The ex-
istence principle overcomes the incompleteness of formal systems and the limits
of Turing machines because it describes the perception of the physical existence
of Turing programs as a whole. This allows a general reference and application
of formal systems to themselves as a whole which cannot be achieved within
formal systems themselves. The generality of Go¨del’s theorem implies its appli-
cability to formalizations of its proof. There is no general formal procedure for
this applicability because formalizations of Go¨del’s proof are incomplete as well,
that is, these formalizations are not general because they cannot include the ap-
plicability of Go¨del’s theorem and proof to themselves. The general existence
principle describes this informal aspect of Go¨del’s theorem and proof. A physi-
cal system that contains an implementation of the physical existence principle
is called creative system. Creative systems can prove the observing formula
of Go¨del’s undecidable formula in an observing formal system which contains
a copy of the incomplete formal system and a formal symbol referring to the
incomplete formal system. Therefore, the observing system is more powerful in
the sense that it can prove more theorems than the observed system.
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